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AMEY vs. ALLEGHENY CITY.

RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.

In the Supreme Court of the United States, December Term, 1860.
HENRY AMEY, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR) VS. THE MAYORI ALDERMEN, AND
CITIZENS OF ALLEGHENY CITY. 1
1. A law of Pennsylvania declaring that "the city corporations of Pittsburg and
Allegheny are authorized to subscribe to the Ohio and Pennsylvania Railroad Company, each, not exceeding $200,000, * * * * and to vote at elections in
the same manner as individual stockholders," and, also, that "the certificates of
loan heretofore issued, or which shall hereafter be issued by them, in payment for
any subscription to the Ohio and Pennsylvania Railroad Company, are exempted
frcm taxation," &c., justified the issue of the bonds by the city of Allegheny for
$200,000 by her Councils, with coupons attached, for her first subscription, and
gaid bonds and coupons are valid.
2. A*aw of Pennsylvania declaring that "the city of Allegheny is authorized to
increase its subscription to the Ohio and Pennsylvania Railroad Company to an
amount not exceeding its first subscription, upon the terms, &c., prescribed to
said subscription; provided, no bonds for the payment of stock subscribed as
aforesaid be issued less than $100," &c., justified the Councils of Allegheny in
issuing bonds, with coupons, for her second subscription to said road of $200,000,
and the said bonds and coupons are valid.
3. The law of Pennsylvania of 8th May, 1850, declaring that "it shall not be lawfil
for the Councils of Allegheny, directly or indirectly, or by bonds, certificates of
loan or indebtedness, or by any contract, or other means or device to increase the
indebtedness of said city in a sum, which, added to the existing debt, shall
together exceed $500,000, exclusive of the subscription of $200,000 to the Ohio
rnd Pennsylvania Railroad," was not intended to apply as a prohibition to the
Legislature, in the exercise of its power to authorize the city to incur a debt
beyond $500,000, but only to the Councils to restrict their general power to incur
debts to the sum of $500,000.
4. The eighth section of the charter of Allegheny City declaring " that so many
of them (the laws, ordinances, &c., in the seventh section) as shall not be published in one public newspaper, &c., within fifteen days after their passage, &c.,
and recorded in the office of Recorder of Deeds, within thirty days, &c., * * *
shall be null and void," does not apply to the ordinance authorizing the subscription and issue of bonds under the laws above mentioned, and the ordinance was
not null and void for want of such recording.
5. The question, under the Constitution of Pennsylvania, whether the Legislature
could give authority to the city of Allegheny to subscribe, &c., has been definitely
and repeatedly settled by the inferior courts as well as by the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, and this court will not discuss it.
2 We are indebted to the Pittsburg Leg. Jour. for this syllabus.-Eds. Am. L. Reg.

A'MEY vs. ALLEGHENY CITY.

On a certificate of division in opinion, between the judges of the
Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of
Pennsylvania.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
WAYNE, J.-This case has been sent to this court on a certificate
of division of opinion between the judges of the Circuit Court for
the Western District of Pennsylvania.
The plaintiff has sued the Mayor and Aldermen and Citizens of
Allegheny city, in actions of debt, upon several coupons of bonds
which were issued by that corporation, and made payable to the
Ohio and Pennsylvania Railroad Company, in payment for two subscriptions, of two hundred thousand dollars each, to the stock of
the latter.
It was agreed by the parties, upon the trial of the cause, to submit
it for the opinion of the court upon a statement, in the nature of a
special verdict, and that verdicts upon the coupons should be entered
accordingly.
The judges, however, in their consideration of the case, differed
in opinion on the following points: "Whether the several acts of
Assembly, recited in the case stated, conferred any authority on the
corporation of the city of Allegheny to issue bonds with coupons,
as had been done, or whether the same are altogether null and void,
by reason of such want of authority, or for any other irregularity
connected with their issue."
It is admitted that the bonds were issued and delivered in payment for subscriptions of stock to the Ohio and Pennsylvania Railroad Company, that they were made payable to that company or
its order, that the company had negotiated them to raise funds to
construct the road, and that the road had been completed in conformity with the conditions of the subscriptions of the defendants.
The parties agree that the subscriptions had been made by the
authority of acts of the Legislature of the State of Pennsylvania, in
conformity with the charter of the railroad company, and were intended to be in pursuance of resolutions and ordinances of the Select
and Common Councils of the city of Allegheny.
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The Mayor was first instructed to subscribe for four thousand
shares of the capital stock of the Ohio and Pennsylvania Railroad
Company, to be paid for in bonds, with coupons attached for interest,
payable semi-annually, the bonds having twenty-five years to run.
The railroad agreed to pay the interest upon the bonds until the
completion of the road, or so much of it as may be adequate to pay
the interest, and that the proceeds of the bonds were to be applied
to the construction of the road from the city of Allegheny to the
mouth of the Big Beaver river, about twenty-five miles. And to
secure the city and the bondholders, it was stipulated, in addition to
the legal obligations incurred in making the subscription, that the
stock, with the interest, earnings, and dividends of the road, should be
pledged to pay the interest, and finally to redeem the bonds. Accordingly, two hundred bonds, of $1,000, were prepared, and were
delivered to the railroad company, on the 1st of January, 1850 ; and
the city at the same time received a certificate of four thousand
shares. The coupons now sued upon were a part of those which
were attached to those bonds.
The second subscription was made, in virtue of another act of the
Assembly of Pennsylvania, and in compliance with a resolution of
the city, dated June 19, 1852. That act authorized the city to
increase its subscription to the capital stock of the railroad company,
to any amount not exceeding its first subscription, upon the laws and
conditions which had been prescribedfor the first; but it restrained
the city from making an issue of bonds of a less denomination than
$100. The act also exempts the stock from the payment of any
tax in consequence of the payment of any interest to stockholders,
until the net earnings of the company shall realize six per cent. per
annum on the capital stock. The city authorities passed an ordinance for this additional subscription, but it was not published in
compliance with the charter of the city, nor was it recorded in the
manner which it is said the charter requires the city ordinance to
be. For those neglects, it is said, the ordinance was null and void,
and that the city had not the power to make the second subscription
under the act of the Legislature. But the city bonds were issued,
and the subscription was made. It is also objected that the ordi-
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nance was endorsed upon the bonds, without any proviso requiring
the railroad company to pay the interest upon them according to its
stipulation. But it is admitted that the road was built first from
the city-to the Big Beaver river, and afterwards completed to its
termination on the western border of Ohio, and thence to Chicago.
The city continues to hold its stock in the railroad company. It
has received five dividends from the company-one of $14,000,

another of $16,000, another of $12,000-which was retained by
the company by the consent of the city, and had been appropriated
to the payment of the coupons for interest; and that $4,000 of those
dividends had been paid in cash, and others in stock. Prior to the
city's second subscription, it appears that the debt of the city had
become $500,000, the limit prescribed by an act of the Legislature.*
That act is, "1that it should not be lawful for the Councils of the
city, either directly or indirectly, by bonds or certificates of loan of
indebtedness, or by virtue of any contract, or by any means or
device whatsoever, to increase its indebtedness to a sum which,
added to the existing debt, shall exceed $500,000, exclusive of the
subscription of $200,000 to the Ohio and Pennsylvania Railroad
Company."
It is admitted, also, that the stock of the city in the railroad company had been voted at all elections of it by order of the city, except
in a single instance, when the city refused to vote. The city was
incorporated on the 11th April, 1840, with all the powers and
authorities then vested by law in the Select and Common Councils
of the city of Philadelphia.
We have given the agreed case of the parties in every particular
in any way bearing on the points about which the judges in the
court below were divided in opinion, and will now consider them.
The subscriptions of the defendants were made under the act of
the 5th April, 1849, and that of the 14th April, 1852. The first
permitted a subscription of $200,000, to be paid for by "certificates
of loan." The second permitted the increase of it, to an amount
not exceeding the first, without, however, having altered the manner
in which the corporate credit of the city was to be used for the payment of the second subscription. We infer, from the words of the
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act, and do not see how it can be otherwise, that it was to be paid
for by the same certificates of indebtedness which the Legislature had
directed to be issued and used for the payment of the first subscription. The act is, "that the city of Allegheny is hereby authorized
to increase its subscription to the capital stock of the said Ohio and
Pennsylvania Railroad Company to any amount not exceeding the
subscription heretofore made by the said city, upon the terms and
conditions prescribed in regard to said previous subscription, provided no bond for the payment of the subscription shall be issued of
a less denomination than one hundred dollars." This proviso is
merely an inhibition upon the city to use for the payment of the
subscription any certificate of indebtedness less than $100 ; and the
-words, "no bond for the payment of the subscription shall be issued,"
when considered in connection with the act authorizing the second
subscription, that it should be made "upon the same terms and conditions of the first, cannot be interpreted into a permission or direction of the Legislature, that the city might use in payment for the
stock any other legal or commercial instrument than "certificates
of loan," Such certificates are well and distinctly known and recognized in the usages and business of lending and borrowing money,
in the transactions of commerce, also, and for raising money upon the
contract in them for industrial enterprises and internal improvements. They were formerly more generally known than otherwise
as "certificates of loan," with certificates for interest attached, payable to the bearer at particular times within the year, at some
particular place, being a part of the contract, from which they must
be cut off to be presented for payment. But now, in their use, they
are called bonds, with coupons for interest-a coupon bond-coupon
being the interest payable separable from the certificate of loan, for
the purpose of receiving it. But neither the instrument nor coupon
has any of the legal characteristics of a bond, either with or without
a penalty, though both are written acknowledgements for the payment of a debt.
Such certificates of loan have been resorted to for many years in
the United States to raise money for internal improvements. They
were as well known and used in Pennsylvania as elsewhere, and
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were permitted to be issued in tha(State by just such enactments
as those which authorized the city of Allegheny to subscribe to the
capital stock of the Ohio and Pennsylvania Railroad Company.
Such an issue was applicable to the subject-matter of legislation.
The city solicited the State to be allowed to make the subscriptions.
It was the policy of the State to grant the application. The subscriptions were made under the act of the 5th April, 1849, and
that of the 14th April, 1852. The first permits a subscription of
8200,000. which was to be paid for by certificates of loan. The act of
the 14th April, 1852, allowed the increase of the subscription to an
amount not exceeding the first, upon the same terms and conditions.
It was the understanding of the Legislature, of the citf, and of the
railroad company, that the subscriptions were to be paid for by th"
corporate credit of the city, by the issue of "certificates of loan." That
appears from the act of 1849, authorizing it, before the subscription
was in fact made. That act provides, in anticipation of its being
done, that the certificates of loan, which shall hereafter be issued by
the city of Allegheny in payment of any subscription to the Ohio
and Pennsylvania Railroad Company, were to be exempt from all
taxation, except for State purposes. The railroad company took
from the city certificates of loan in payment of the subscriptions,
sold them as such, and with the money built the road. Such a concurrence of contemporaneous action by all the parties interested in
the subject-matter of legislation, prove that it was the intention of
the Legislature that the authority given to the city to make the subscriptions to the railroad company, had been carried out just as it
was meant to have been.
We answer, therefore, that the several acts of Assembly stated in
the agreed case did confer authority on the corporation of the city
of Allegheny to issue certificates of loan, otherwise bonds with coupons, as was done, to pay for its first and second subscriptions to
the capital stock of the Ohio and Pennsylvania Railroad Company.
We will now inquire whether the bonds or certificates of loan
which were issued, are null and void "for any irregularity connected
with their issue."
It is said there were two irregularities which made them so. The
first is, that the debt of the city had reached its limit of 500,000
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prior to the second subscription. The second is, that the city ordinances, authorizing the issue for the payment of the subscriptions,
were null and void, from not having been published in conformity
with the charter of the city.
The first objection depends upon the proper construction of the
act of 8th May, 1850, section 4, in connection with the act of the
14th April, 1852, which authorized the second subscription. The
first declares that the indebtedness of the city should not be made
to exceed five hundred thousand dollars, exclusive of the subscription
of two hundred thousand dollars to the railroad company; and it
is urged, that the act of the 14th April, 1852, though it authorizes
the city to make a second subscription of two hundred thousand
dollars, does not permit the city to increase its debt to a larger sum
than seven hundred thousand dollars, to which it was limited by the
first act of 1850. The objection has arisen from a misconception
of the fourth section of the act of 1850. It provides that it shall
not be lawful for the Councils of the city of Allegheny, either directly
or indirectly, or by bonds, certificates or loans, or of indebtedness,
or by virtue of any contract, or by any other means or device whatsoever, to increase the indebtedness of the said city, in a sum which,
added to the existing debt, shall, taken together, exceed five hundred
thousand dollars, exclusive of the subscription of two hundred
thousand dollars to the Pennsylvania Railroad Company; meaning,
obviously, that no increase of debt should be made by the Councils
beyond the sum of $500,000, but not intending that the Legislature
might not authorize an increase of it beyond that amount, as it had
previously done by authorizing the first subscription to the railroad
company. The same political power which allowed the first subscription, could, at a succeeding session of the Legislature, give authority to the city to make a second. Such authority was given by
the act of the 14th April, 1852. The City Councils could not, under
its charter, have made either the first or second subscription without
authority from the Legislature, but by its charter it could contract
debts for the purpose of its incorporationto a larger amount than
$500,000. When, then, the Legislature was called upon to authorize
the city to make the first subscription, increasing its indebtedness
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two hundred thousand dollars beyond what the city might have owed
them for other purposes, it was thought prudent, as well for the
protection of the citizens of Allegheny as for those who might purchase these certificates of stock with coupons, to declare that the
Councils of the city should not thereafter, by virtue of their charter
authority to contract debts, by any device whatever, increase its
amount to more than five hundred thousand dollars. And as it has
turned out, judging from the attitude of the Mayor, Aldermen, and
Citizens of Allegheny in this suit, it must be admitted to have been
upon the'part of the Legislature of Pennsylvania a very commendable precautionary act of legislation.
Having thus disposed of the first irregularity imputed to the
Councils of Allegheny, in making their issue for the payment of the
second subscription, we proceed to the second.
It is, that the ordinance of the city directing the issue for the
payment of the second subscription, had not been recorded within
thirty days. It is admitted in the stated case that it had not been.
By the eighth section of the charter of the city of Allegheny, it is
provided, that in order that a knowledge of the laws, ordinances,
regulations, and constitutions of the city, authorized by the seventh
section of the charter, may at all times be had and obtained, and
the publications thereof at all times be known and ascertained, such
and so many of them as shall not be published in one or more of
the public newspapers published in the city, or in such other way
as the Select and Common Councils may direct, within fifteen days
after these laws severally passed, &c., &c., and also recorded in the
office for the recording of deeds, &c., &c., &c., within thirty days
after these laws passed, &c., &c., shall be null and void.
Now it does not require a very careful examination of the section
to determine that it cani have no bearing upon the ordinance directing the issue for the payment of the second subscription of the city
to the Ohio and Pennsylvania Railroad Company, for in terms it is
only applicable to ordinances, &c., authorized by the seventh section
of the charter,and that did notpermit such a subscription to be made,
and paid for by the city stock, as the ordinance for that purpose
was intended. It could only be made by the authority of the Legis-
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lature. In other words, the Legislature enlarged the powers of
the Councils of Allegheny to do what it could not do by charter.
Besides, if the section was not limited to such ordinances, &c., &c., as
are authorized by the seventh section of the charter,and those words
were not in it,-it could have no application to an ordinance of the
city passed for a special purpose to carry out an act of the Legislature,
outside of the charter, as was the case here. We have determined
that the acts of the Legislature have been carried out by the city
in the way they should have been done. Neither the ordinance nor
the stock issued by the city are deficient in any substantial particular. The latter has every formality of the corporation to give
them currency. They were circulated for ten years, and were constantly acknowledged by the city as its bonds for the purposes for
which they were issued. They are now in the hands of bona fide
transferees, to whom they must be paid according to their terms.
It would be inequitable if the city could repudiate them at all, and,
more especially, if that were allowed to be done upon the ground of
any fault in the corporation in their issue. But we will not enlarge
further upon the case. The points of objection of which we have
treated, have already been before this court in several cases, and
they are worthy of perusal. See the cases of the Commissioners of
_Knox Countj, Indiana, vs. Wallace, 21 Howard, 239; Zabriskie
vs. Cleveland, Columbus, and Cincinnati Railroad Company, 23
Howard, 381.
We have not, in our treatment of this certified division of opinion,
discussed that position of the learned counsel who argued it for the
defendant, that the acts of the Legislature of Pennsylvania, authorizing the issue of certificates of loan, were unconstitutional.
Agreeing with him in the main, as to the foundations upon which
the correctness of legislation should be tesied, and the objects for
which it ought to be approved, we cannot, with the respect which
we have for the judiciary of his State, discuss the imputed unconstitutionality of the acts upon which the subscriptions were made to
the Ohio and Pennsylvania Railroad Company, it having been
repeatedly decided by the judges of the courts of Pennsylvania,
including its Supreme Court, that acts fbr the same purposes as those
are which we have have been considering were constitutional.
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We shall order it to be certified, that the issue of bonds with coupons, in the case stated, are not null and void, but that it was done
under the authority of constitutional acts of the State of Pennsylvania, in the case stated; and, further, that they are not null and
void for any irregularity connected with that issue by the city of
Allegheny.

In the Supreme Court of the United States, December Term, 1860.
THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF KNOX COUNTY, PLAINTIFFS IN ERROR,
VS.

WILLIAM

H. ASPINWALL, JOSEPH W. ALSOP, HENRY CHANCERY,

CHAS. GOULD, AND SAMUEL L. M. BARLOW.
1. It is a well-establisbed principle of the common law that the writ of mandamus
is a remedy to compel any person, corporation, public functionary, or tribunal, to perform some duty required by law, where the party seeking relief has no
other legal remedy, and the duty sought to be conferred is clear.
2. The Circuit Court of the United States has authority, under the Judiciary Act,
to issue a mandamus, to compel County Commissioners to levy a special tax,
provided by Act of Assembly, to pay the interest on the county's coupon bonds,
issued under authority of law.

In Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Indiana.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
GIiER, J.-The plaintiffs in error were defendants in a suit by
Aspinwall and others, in which a judgment was recovered for
interest coupons on bonds issued by the corporation. The cause
-was removed to this court, and may be found reported in 21 Howard, 539. The judgment of the circuit court was affirmed, and
the record remitted.
In order to enforce the execution of this judgment, the plaintiffs
moved for a mandamus to the commissioners, to compel them to levy
a tax to satisfy the judgment. The record shows that the board
of commissioners appeared in the circuit court and resisted the
motion, on several grounds, but chiefly that the court had no jurisdiction to issue a mandamus in this case.
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The act of assembly of Indiana, which authorized the issue of
the bonds and coupons, which were the subject of the litigation,
may be found in the former report of the case. 21 How. 542.
It appears that by the third section of this act it is made the
duty of the commissioners, for the purpose of paying the interest
due on the bonds, " at the levying of the county taxes for each
year, to assess a special tax, sufficient to realize the amount of the
interest to be paid for the year."
This the commissioners had not done, and refused to do so, on
notice and request of the defendants in error.
Now, it is not alleged nor pretended but that if this judgment
had been obtained against the corporation in a State court, the
remedy now sought could have been obtained: for it must be
admitted, that according to the well-established principles and
usage of the common law, the writ of mandamus is a remedy to
compel any person, corporation, public functionary, or tribunal to
perform some duty required by law, where the party seeking relief
has no other legal remedy, and the duty sought to be enforced is
clear and indisputable. That this case comes completely within
the category is too clear for argument: for even assuming that a
general law of Indiana permits the public property of the county
to be levied on and sold for the ordinary indebtedness of the
county, it is clear that the bonds and coupons issued under the
special provisions of this act were not left to this uncertain and
insufficient remedy. The act provides a special fund for the payment of these obligations, on the faith and credit of which they
were negotiated. It is especially incorporated into the contract, that
this corporation shall assess a tax for the special purpose of paying the interest on these coupons. If the commissioners either
neglect or refuse to perform this plain duty, imposed on them by
law, the only remedy which the injured party can have for such
refusal or neglect is the writ of mandamus.
- Why should not the Circuit Court of the United States be competent to give to suitors this only adequate remedy ?
By the common law, the writ of mandamus is granted by,the
King's Bench, in virtue of its prerogative and supervisory power
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over inferior courts. The courts of the United States cannot issue
this writ by virtue of any supervisory power at common law over
inferior State tribunals. They can derive it only from the Constitution and laws of the United States.
The jurisdiction of these courts is, by the Constitution, extended
to "controversies between citizens of different States." Congress
has authority to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper
for carrying this jurisdiction into effect. The jurisdiction of the
Court to give the judgment in this case is not disputed, nor can it
be denied that, by the Constitution, Congress has the power to
make laws necessary for carrying into execution all its judgments.
See Wailman vs. Southard, 10 Wheaton, 22. Has it done so?
By the fourteenth section of the judiciary act of 1789, it is
enacted "that courts of the United States shall have power to
issue writs of scire facias, habeas corpus, and all other writs not
specially provided for by statute, which may be necessary for the
exercise of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the principles of the common law."
Now, the "jurisdiction" is not disputed, and is it not "'necessary" to an efficient exercise of this jurisdiction that the Court
have authority to compel the exercise of a ministerial duty by the
corporation, which by law they are bound to perform, and by the
performance of which, alone, the plaintiffs' remedy can be effected?
The fund to pay this judgment, by the face of the contract, is a
special tax laid and to be collected by defendants. They refuse
to perform a plain duty. There is no other writ'which can afford
the party a remedy, which the Court is bound to afford, if within
its constitutional powers, except that afforded by this writ of
mandamus.
It is "agreeable to the principles of the common law," and,
consequently, within the category, as defined by the statute.
A court of equity is sometimes resorted to as ancillary to a court
of law in obtaining satisfaction of its judgments. But no court,
having proper jurisdiction and process to compel the satisfaction of
its own judgments, can be justified in turning its suitors over to
another tribunal to obtain justice. It is no objection, therefore,
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to the use of this remedy, that the party might possibly obtain
another by commencing a new litigation in another tribunal.
We are of opinion, therefore, that the circuit court had authority
to issue the writ of mandamus in this case.
It is no reason for setting it aside, that a previous alternative
writ had not issued. The notices served on the commissioners
gave them every opportunity of defense that could have been
obtained by an alternative mandamus. There was no dispute
about facts which could affect the decision. The Court gave them
an opportunity to comply with the demand of the plaintiffs; their
excuse for not doing so was, palpably, "a mere colorable adjournment or procrastination of the performances of the act for the
purpose of delay." It is equivalent to a refusal. Having refused
to perform the duty which the law imposed upon them on the
proper day, without even the pretence of a reason for such conduct, the peremptory mandamus was very properly awarded, commanding the duty to be performed "forthwith."
The judgment of the circuit court is, therefore, affirmed with
costs.

In the District Court of the United States for the Wisconsin
.District.
GREENE C. BRONSON AND OTHERS VS. THE LA CROSSE AND MILWAUKEE
RAILROAD COMPANY. IN EQUITY.
1. By the act of Congress and the rules of practice of the circuit courts of the United
States, in equity, a party has a right to have witnesses within the jurisdiction of
the court examined in open court; or he may have a commission issued with
written interrogatories annexed for the examination of such witnesses, unless the
interrogatories be waived by the opposite party, when the examination is had as
a deposition, but the commission may be dispensed with by consent.
2. In States where there is no law regulating the taking of depositions of witnesses
within the jurisdiction, the act of 1802 does not apply; and one party cannot
require the other party to attend the taking of the depositions of such witnesses before a master unless in cases ipecially provided for in the act of September, 1789.
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The opinion of the Court was delivered by
MILLER, J.-At the instance of complainants' counsel, a master
of this court notified defendants' counsel that the depositions of
certain witnesses who were within the jurisdiction would be taken
before him on a day named, to be read in evidence at the hearing of
this cause. The defendants' counsel refused to attend; and he has
moved the court to suppress the depositions, on the ground that
they were taken without authority.
By section 30 of the act to organize the judicial courts of the
United States, 1 Statutes at Large, 88,-" The mode of proof by
oral testimony and examination of witnesses in open court shall be
the same in all the courts of the United States, as well in the trial
of causes in equity and of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction as of
actions at common law." And by section 25 of the act of April
29, 1802, 2 Statutes at Large, 166,-" In all suits in equity it
shall be in the discretion of the court, upon the request of either
party, to order the testimony of the witnesses therein to be taken
by depositions, which depositions shall be taken in conformity to
the regulations prescribed by law for the courts of the highest original jurisdiction in equity in cases of a similar nature, in that State
in which the Court of the United States may be holden; Provided,
however, that nothing herein contained shall extend to the circuit
courts which may be holden in those States in which testimony in
chancery is not taken by depositions." The Constitution of the
State of Wisconsin directs that, "the testimony in causes in equity
shall be taken in like manner as in cases at law, and the office of
master in chancery is abolished."
In (ann vs. Penn, 5 Wheaton, 424, decided in the year 1820,
Marshall, C. J., remarks,-" The judiciary act directs that the mode
of 'Proof shall be by oral testimony, and that witnesses shall be
examined in open court." "The act of 1802 leaves it to the discretion of the court in those States where testimony in chancery is
taken by depositions, to order, on the request of either party, the
testimony of the witnesses to be taken by depositions." It will be
observed that the act of 1802 does not apply to this court, as by
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the constitution of the State, testimony of witnesses is to be taken
in court, in the same manner in cases in equity as at law.
In pursuance of the act of May 8, 1792, section 2, 1 Statutes at
Large, 276, which empowered the Supreme Court of the United
States to regulate proceedings in equity, and from time to time by
rule to prescribe regulations to any circuit or district court concerning the same, the Supreme Court, at the term of February,
1822, adopted rules of practice for the courts of equity of the
United States, which are to be found in 7 Wheaton's Reports. By
these rules, "testimony may be taken according to the acts of Congress or under a commission. And all testimony taken under a
commission shall be taken on interrogatories and cross-interrogatories filed in the cause, unless the parties shall dispense therewith."
At the term of the Supreme Court of the United States of January,
1842, a new set of rules of practice were adopted for the courts in
equity, to take effect on the first day of August of that year. By
rule 67, after the cause is at issue, commissions to take testimony
may be taken out in vacation as well as in term jointly by both
parties, or severally by either party upon interrogatories-the
commissioners to be named by the court or the judge, or by an
amendment, by the clerk. If the parties so agree the testimony
may be taken upon oral interrogatories by the parties or their
agents without filing any written interrogatories. This rule follows
the previous rule, in requiring a commission with written interrogatories, unless they be waived by the parties. By rule 68, testimony
may also be taken by depositions according to the acts of Congress.
But in such case, if no notice be given to the adverse party of the
time and place of taking the depositions, he shall be entitled to a
cross-examination. The first sentence of this rule in effect recognizes the acts of Congress above cited, and also the whole of section
80 of the act to establish the judicial courts of the United States,
approved September 24, 1789. The act of 1802 not being applicable to this district, the only act binding on this court is the act
of 1789.
By section 6 of an act approved August 23, 1842, 5 Statutes
at Large, 518, the Supreme Court is invested with full power and
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authority from time to time to prescribe, regulate, and alter the
forms and modes of taking and obtaining evidence. This act was
passed and went into force subsequently to the present rules, and
the Supreme Court have not exercised the authority conferred by
changing them in this particular.
From this investigation of the subject I have come to the conclusion that, according to the rules of practice, the only method of
taking the testimony of witnesses within the jurisdiction, to be read
in cases in equity in this district, is either by examination in open
court or upon a commission with written interrogatories annexed,
unless they be dispensed with by the parties. But it is competent
to the parties to dispense with a commission ; and if such agreement
is in writing, and made before the master or commissioner, it cannot
be withdrawn after the testimony is taken in pursuance of it.
In the case of Sickles vs. The Gloucester Company, in the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, Legal Intelligencer, (to be reported in 3
Wallace, Jr., Reports,) a rule for a commission had been taken by
the defendant, and the counsel of the other side having filed the
complainant's affidavit that the evidence, if taken before a commissioner upon interrogatories and cross-interrogatories, would
operate unjustly and prejudicially to his interests, obtained a special
order that he might have powei" to cross-examine the witnesses ore
tenus; and that the testimony so taken shall have the same effect
as if taken under rule 67. A motion to suppress the depositions
taken in pursuance of the order was denied by the Court. The
Court considered that the secret or private examination of witnesses
in courts of equity has been repudiated by statute, and never has
been a fundamental principle in their administration in the courts
of the United States; and that the rule 67 does not annul the act
of Congress, or the policy established by it. That was a patent
case, and came peculiarly within the duty *of the Court to have the
examination of the witnesses with the models before them.
The practice. to be observed in this district is, to take the testimony of witnesses within the jurisdiction in open court, or upon
commission with interrogatories annexed, unless dispensed with,
when counsel examine the witnesses ore tenus before the commis-
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sioner, or by consent, by depositions waiving commission- and
written interrogatories. In this district, where there is no State
law to give effect to the act of April, 1802, one party cannot require
the opposite party to attend before a commissioner or master to
take the depositions of witnesses within the jurisdiction, to be read
at the final hearing of a cause in equity, except in cases specially
provided for in the act of September, 1789. The depositions will
be ordered stricken from the files.

.bn the Supreme Court of Penn8sylvania.
GUTHRIE'S APPEAL.
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1. Thewordsof a will were, "I give and bequeath to my daughter, Elizabeth Bones,
the use and life estate in her own proper person, (but without power to convey
the same to any other person for any period or term,) all my messuage, tenement, etc., and at the decease of my said daughter, Elizabeth, the said lot or
tract of land I hereby bequeath to such of her 'hildren or their heirs as may
survive her, as tenants in common; that is, the child or children of any deceased child of hers shall hold the same interest and right that the deceased
parent would have held if living." Held, that under the terms of the will,
Elizabeth Bones took only an estate for life.
2. The cases of .'Kee

vs.

t'Kinley, 9 Casey, 89; Williams vs. Leech, 4 Casey,

89; and Naglee's Appeal, 9 Casey, 89, questioned.

Appeal from the Orphans' Court of Chester county.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
STRONG, J.-The words of the will of Robert Harris, out of
which arises the controversy in this base, are as follows :-" I give
and bequeath to my daughter, Elizabeth, wife of James Bones, the

'We have been furnished by the counsel for the plaintiff, in the case of
M'Kee vs. M'Kinley, with a paper book of the argument in that case, from which
we gather some material facts which do not appear in the report in 9 Casey, 92.
From the paper book in 'M'Kee vs. M'Kinley, it appears that at the date
of the testator's will, 26th January, 1846, the first taker, Mrs. M'Kee, the
plaintiff, had not any child or issue born, nor had she any child or issue until nearly
five months after testator's death. There were, therefore, no children or issue of
plaintiff in esse, either at the date of the will, or when it went into operation, a
feature in the case which does not appear in the report in 9 Casey.
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use and life estate in her own proper. person, (but without power to
convey the same to any other person for any period or term,) all
my messuage, tenement, and lot or tract of land whereon she now
resides with her husband, in the township of Brandywine, and
county of Chester, which I purchased at sheriff's sale as the property of William Christman, and containidg fifty acres, be the
same more or less-and at the decease of my said daughter, Elizabeth, the said lot or tract of land and appurtenances, I hereby
bequeath to such of her children and their heirs as may survive
her, as tenants in common; that is, the child and children of any
deceased child of hers shall hold the same interest and right that
the deceased parent would have held if living." At the time when
the will was made, Elizabeth Bones had several children, and all
her children were born before the will was proved, and probably
before the death of the testator. The fundamental question is,
What estate did she take under this devise? If more than a life
estate, it must be by virtue of the rule in Shelley's case, and the
effort of the appellant has been to establish that under that rule
she took an estate tail.
The rule, which existed long before the case that gave it its name,
is thus stated by Lord Coke in 1 Co. 104, (a,) "When the ancestor, by any gift or conveyance, takes an estate of freehold, and in
the same gift or conveyance an estate is linjited either mediately or
immediately to his heirs, in fee or in tail, always in such cases heirs
are words of limitation of the estate, and not words of purchase."
From the report of the case and the opinion of the Court, pp. 92, 93, Judge Strong
has inferred that there was no argument except in support of a tenancy in fee of the
first taker. The paper book and authorities cited, however, would show the contrary, and that the argument was exclusively devoted to prove that Mrs. M'Kee
took an estate tail, and that no argument whatever was made in support of a tenancy in fee in her.
The point decided, therefore, in M'Kee vs. M'Kinley does not at all conflict with
the decision in Guthrie's Appeal, where the first taker, "at the time when the will
was made, had several children, and all her children were born before the will was
proved, and probably before the death of the testator." On the other hand, it is
in accordance with other parts of the opinion of Judge Strong, and with the language of C. J. Lewis, in Gernet vs. Lynn, cited above. Judge Strong was absent at
Xisi Prius when M'Kee and M'Kinley was argued.-Eds. Am. Law Rueg.
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It has been somewhat differently stated by Preston, in his treatise
on Estates, page 263, and again differently by Hayes, in his treatise on Estates Tail, page 4, and still differently-by Smith, in his
work on Executory Interests, page 400 ; but in every statement of
it, the essentials are substantially the same. The inheritance in
remainder must be given to the heirs of the grantee or devisee of
the estate for life, as heirs, or the rule has no applicability to the
case. Preston's analysis of it shows that the limitation of the
remainder must be to the " heirs," or " heirs of the body," of the
person taking the particular estate "by that or some such substantial name, and not to the heirs, as meaning or explai6ed to be sons'
children," etc. Smith, in his work on Executory Interests, states,
as necessary to the application of the rule, that the limitation of
the remainder should be to the heir or heirs of the body of him
who takes the particular estate of freehold "by that description
and in that character, or to his heir or the heir of his body, in the
singular number, but as a nomen colleetivum in the sense of heirs
or heirs of the body." It is, therefore, always a precedent question, in any case to which it is supposed the rule is applicable,
whether the limitation of the remainder is made to the heirs in fee
or in tail, as such, and in solving this question, the rule itself
renders no assistance. It is silent until the intention of the grantor
or devisor is ascertained. But if their intention is found to be
that the remainder-men are to take as heirs of the grantee or
devisee of the particular freehold, instead of becoming themselves
the root of a new succession, the rule is applied, though it may
defeat a manifest intention that the first taker should have but an
estate for life. It is very carefully to be noted, that in searching
for the intention of the donor or testator, the inquiry is not whether
the remainder-men are the persons who would have been heirs, had
the fee been limited directly to the ancestor. The thing to be
sought for is not the persons who are directed to take the remainder,
but the character in which the donor intended they should take.
In very many cases in which the question has arisen whether the
rule was applicable, the difficulty, has been in determining whether
the intention was that the remainder-men should take as heirs of
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the first taker, or originally as the stock of a new inheritance; the
effort in almost all of them has been to show that the words If heirs"
or "heirs of the body" were not used in their technical sense, as
expressive of the nature and extent of the devise, and its descent,
but as descriptio personarum, designatory of.individuals. To
those words the law attaches a definite meaning. They are words
of limitation, and not of purchase. When used by a testator, the
law presumes that he used them in their legal sense, that he intended not individuals, but quantity of estate and descent. Whenever they are employed, therefore, the burden is thrown upon him
who contends that they are words of purchase, to rebut this presumption, and to show that they were used in the particular grant
or devise to designate persons. Undoubtedly, the word "heirs"
may be shown by their context to have been used in the sense of
sons, daughters, children, etc. ; and when it is so used, the rule in
Shelley's case is inapplicable; Fearne on Remainders, 188, 189;
Smith on Executory Interests, 479. But the cases abundantly
show that the intent not to use the words in their legal sense must
be unequivocal, "that it must appear so plainly (to use the language of Lord Alvanley) that no one can misunderstand it ;" 3 B.
& P. 620.
The limitation of the remainder in the present case, however, is
not to the heir or heirs of the body of Elizabeth Bones, the first
taker of the freehold, but to "such of her children or their heirs
as may survive her, as tenants in common ; that is, the child or
children of any deceased child of hers shall hold the same interest
and right that the deceased parent would have held if living."
There is, therefore, no presumption that the remainder-men were
intended to take as heirs, arising from the use of technical words
of limitation. There is, indeed, a contrary presumption.
The
word children is not a word of limitation, but a personal description, In Burgar vs. Bradford, 2 Atk. 222, Lord Hardwicke said,
" Children, in their natural import, are words of purchase, and not
of limitation, unless it is to comply with the intention of the testator, when the words cannot take effect in any other way." Hayes,
also, says, (page 35,) "But the words children, sons, etc., are pro-
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perly descriptive of a particular class or generation of issue. They
point not at heritable succession, but individual acquisition. Their
effect differs in nothing from a designation of individuals by name,
except that a devise to several ' nominatim' as tenants in common, fails as to the shares of those dying before the testator." He
adds, "The rules of construction freely permit, however, the use of
the words 'heirs of the body,' or 'issue,' in the limited sense, of
children, and of the word children, in the comprehensive sense of
the words ' heirs of the body,' these rules, or rather the fundamental principle of legal interpretation, requiring only a clear explanation to justify a departure from the ordinary meaning, imposing on
those who would translate the term the onus of producing an
express warrant under the hand of the author of the gift." Admitting now, with Mr. Hayes, that the word "children" may be construed to mean "1heirs of the body," yet there must be, as he says,
an express warrant for this change of its legitimate meaning, under
the hand of the author of the gift. The intention to use it as
a word of limitation, contrary to its natural import, must be
rendered clear by the words of the grantor or testator himself.
Conjecture, doubt, or even equilibrium of apparent intention
will not suffice. The language of Mr. Justice Blackstone, in
his celebrated argument in the case of Perrin vs. Blake, is well
worthy of notice. After stating that the question of the testator's
intent was not upon the quantity of estate intended to be given to
John Williams, the ancestor, but upon the nature of the estate intended to be given to the heirs of his body, and declaring that if
the testator intended that they should take as purchasers,then John,
the ancestor, remained only tenant for life; and that if he meant
they should take by descent, or had formed no intention about the
matter, then by operation and consequence of law, the inheritance
first vested in the ancestor. He adds, "The true question, therefore, is whether the testator has or has not plainly declared his
intent that the heirs of the body of John Williams shall take an
estate by purchase, entirely detached from and unconnected with
the estate of their ancestor." (The words used in the will were
"heirs of the body," and the defendant labored to show that they
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were words of purchase.) Mr. Justice Blackstone further remarked,
"It is not incumbent on the plaintiff to show by express evidence
that his testator meant to adhere to the rule of law, (i. e. that
heirs of the body are words of limitation,) for thai is always supposed till the contrary is clearly proved; but it is incumbent on
the defendant to show by plain and manifest indications that the
testator intended to deviate from the general rule; for that is never
supposed till made out, not by conjecture, but by strong and conclusive evidence." But children in law is as certainly held to be
a word of pirchase as "heirs of the body" are to be words of
limitation. If there be so much difficulty in converting "heirs
of the body" into words of personal description, at least equal
difficulties must surround the attempt to elevate the word
children into a word of limitation. It in itself ascertains only
the objects of the grant or devise, not at' all the nature or
extent of the estate given. These must be sought for elsewhere.
It is worthy of notice, that among the eighty-two cases contained in the tables of Mr. Hayes, there is not one in which
a devise of the remainder to children was held within the scope
of the rule in Shelley's case, and to vest an estate in tail in the
ancestor, to whom a freehold for life was limited by the same
will or conveyance. In every case in which an estate tail was held
to have thus vested, the author of the gift bad made use of the
words "heirs of the body," or "issue," which latter is a word of
doubtful meaning, though generally a word of limitation in a will;
and if he used the word "son," he used also in explanation of it,
and as its synoym, the word "issue." In most of the cases where
the word son was used, the tenancy in the tail of the ancestor was
implied, not from that word, but from a devise over "on failure of
is8ue." It is not denied that the word children may be used by a
testator as a nomen collectivum, signifying "heirs of the body,"
but I have found no case in which it has been held to have been so
used, unless the testator has also employed the words "heirs of the
body," or as descriptive of the same objects. Nothing less appears
to be sufficient to repel the presumption that the testator did not
intend a limitation by the use of this word of purchase. There is
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no such thing in this case. There is nothing indicative of the testator's purpose that the remainder-men should not take as purchasers, but as heirs of Elizabeth Bones, unless it can be found in the
fact that they are the same persons who would have inherited the
estate, if it had been limited in fee directly to her. That throws
no light, however, upon the nature of their estate. It refers only to
the objects of the testator's bounty. It would have existed if they
had been described nominatim, and then, doubtless, it would have
been utterly insufficient to rebut the presumption arising from the
use of the word children, that they were intended to take as purchasers, and not through their mother. Nor is the limitation of the
remainder to children surviving the first tenant of the freehold, and
to children of children who may be deceased at the death of that
tenant, unequivocally indicative of an intention that they shall take
as heirs of the tenant for life. At most, it is but a description of
persons, with the part to be taken by each. It points to no line of
succession. It does not refer to Elizabeth Bones as the root of
descent. Without the word "heirs" applied to the remainder-men
there is still nothing to show that the testator looked beyond those
who might be in being when Elizabeth Bones should die, or that he
bad in any view any continuous line of succession. When it was
said, as it was in a recent case, M'Kee vs. M'.Kinley, 9 Cas., 93,
that "if the remainder is to persons standing in the relation of
heirs, general or special, of the tenant for life, the law presumes
them to take as heirs, unless it unequivocally appears that individuals, other than persons who are to take simply as heirs, are
intended," the assertion was too broad. Such a presumption is
made only when technical words of limitation are applied to the
It will be
remainder-men, when the gift is to "heirs" or "issue."
seen from some of the cases hereafter to be cited, that the fact that
the remainder-men stand in the relation of heirs, is insufficient to
overcome the presumption of law, that by "sons," etc., purchasers
were meant, even though the testator directed that they should take
in the order of heirs.
Besides, there are in this will provisions which, in addition to the
description of the remainder-men by the term children, show an
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intent that they shall not take as heirs of the tenant for life. The
gift is to them distributively, as tenants in common, or to their
heirs. Such a taking distributively, as tenants in common, is altogether inconsistent with the children taking as heirs in tail of their
mother, the devisee of the life estate. Certainly, always in England,
and in this State, until the act of 1838, if not since, estates tail
generally descended not according to our intestate laws, but to the
heir at common law. A direction that the children should take in
common was, therefore, repugnant to their taking as heirs of the
body, and it evinces an intent that they were to take as purchasers. True, it has been ruled that in cases where the remainder is
limited to "heirs of the body," a direction that they shall take distributively, will not prevent the application of the rule in Shelley's
case, but this is because the presumption of limitation, arising from
the use of the word "heirs," is too strong to be rebutted by the
repugnant provision for distribution. It never yet has been held
that such a provision can be rejected when the remainder is limited
to objects described by apt words of purchase. So, too, it has been
held that the rule applies, though in addition to the first words of
inheritance, viz: heirs or heirs of the body, there are superadded
words of limitation, similar to the first, but this is for the same
reason. It is a mistake to argue that because certain things will
not suffice to convert "heirs" or "heirs of the body" into words of
purchase, they are of no consequence when the search is for the
meaning of children, or any other word ndturally descriptive of persons, rather than estates. And even when the limitation is to heirs
of the body, to take distributively, with similar words of limitation
added, such a direction is held to convert even the technical words
"heirs of the body" into words of purchase. Smith on Exec. Int.
488; Fearne on Rem. 154.
It is contended, however, that under the doctrine of -Pricevs.
Taylor, 4 Casey, 95, estates tail descend under our law of 1833,
and, hence, that the limitation to the childrei of the testator's
daughter and the children of her deceased children, to take, as
tenants in common, the grandchildren, what would have been the
share of the deceased parent, was in accordance with our rules of
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lineal descent. From this it is argued that the direction they should
take, distributively, is equivalent to a direction that they should
take as heirs.
Price vs. Taylor, however, is not to be regarded as a decision that
estates tail are embraced within our intestate act of 1833. It contains, indeed, an intimation that it may be so, with some reasons for
the supposition given by the learned judge who deliveked the
opinion. The suggestion is repeated by the same judge in Williams
vs. Leec1 , 4 Cas. 89. To this suggestion we cannot assent. However just such descent may seem, however consonant it may be with
the general tendency of our customs and laws, descent of such
estates, according to the course of common law, had, up to 1838,
been an established rule of property in this State, and such rules
are not to be regarded as destroyed by statute, unless by express
direction or necessary implication. There is no such direction or
implication in the act of 1833. Certainly until that time estates
tail descended as at common law. They were not embraced within
any of our former intestate acts. A reference to the language of
each makes it clear that the subject-matter for distribution or descent
has been the same in them all. The act of 1705 enacted that "the
surplusage or remaining portion of the intestate's lands, etc., not
sold or ordered to be sold by virtue of the act, and not otherwise
limited by marriage settlement, shall be divided," etc. In Goodright vs. Morning Star, 1 Yeates, 315, the question arose whether
estates tail were embracedc within it, and it was held that they were
not. The Court said that it was too late now (in 1793) to stir the
point, whatever reason there might have been for it in the first
instance. The invariable opinion of lawyers, said they, since the
act of 1705, has been that the lands entailed descended according
to the course of the common law; and it is understood, generally,
that it had been so adjudged in early times. All the common
-ecoveries which have been suffered by the heirs of the donees in
tail have been conformable to that principle; to unsettle so many
titles at this late day would be productive of endless confusion.
Our act of 1705 only regulates the descent of lands amongst the
children, where the father is seized thereof, and might dispose of
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them by deed or will. It leaves other cases of descent as they
were at common law. Then came the act of 1794, a substitute for
that of 1705, the language of which is, "The remaining part of
any lands, tenements and hereditaments, and personal estate of any
person deceased not sold or disposed of by will, nor otherwise
limited by marriage settlement, shall be divided and be enjoyed in
manner following," etc. It is obvious that it was intended to follow
the preceding act of 1705. It never was supposed that any provision was made for the descent of estates tail. They continued to
descend as at common law, without question at least, until the act
of 1833. No one doubts this. The courts and the profession
concurred in the opinion that estates tail and trusts were not within
the purviews of the intestate laws. Jenks vs. Backhouse, 1 Bin.96 ;
Lfyle vs. .ichards, 9 S. & R. 354. When the act of 1833 was
passed, the former acts had received a settled judicial and professional construction. Nor did that act profess to include the estates
tail. Its language was evidently taken from that of the preceding
statutes. The words are, "The real and personal estates of a decedent remaining after the payment of debts and legal charges, and
which shall not have been sold, or disposed of by will, or otherwise
limited by marriage settlement, shall be divided and enjoyed as
follows." It cannot be maintained that there is any substantial
difference between these three acts in the particular now under consideration. They all point to property over which the decedent had
a power of testamentary disposition, and they step in only to supply
the failure of such disposal. Now, as the former acts were well understood not to include estates tail, it must be inferred that when the
Legislature adopted, in the act of 1833, substantially the language
of those acts, they used it in the sense then understood, and had
not in view such interests. It would have been a great change
of a well-known rule of property to have included such interests
in the intestate laws, and it is not to be supposed that if the Legislature contemplated such a change they would not have used language clearly expressive of their intent. The common law is the
law of Pennsylvania, and can only be changed by legislative
enactment, clearly indicating an intention to work a change. The
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presumption always is, that no alteration is intended. It is suggested in Price vs. Taylor, as one reason for the supposition that
estates tail may descend under our act of 1833, "that our old
statutes of descent provided only for the descent of lands which
the decedent could dispose of by deed or will, and estates tail did
not then fall within that category. But the act of 1799 changed
this, and allowed estates tail to be sold and conveyed in a very
simple form. Therefore, it is said, "the new law of intestates of
1833 expressly includes such estates, because it declares the line
of descent of all land which the decedent might have sold in his
lifetime, or disposed of by will." There is, however, nothing in.
the acts of 1705 and 1794, as assumed in this reason, which
describes the property contemplated by them as only that which
the decedent might have disposed of by deed. The words, "dispose of by deed," are not in either of the acts. The language of
the first is, "not sold or ordered to be sold by virtue of this act,"
evidently referring to the remainder, after so much should have
been disposed of as was necessary for the payment of the decedent's debts. It contemplated no sale by the decedent, but sales
by his representatives. And even before the act of 1799, a tenant
in tail could sell and bind his issue. Common recoveries were
always in use in this State. The act of 1709 only gave a new
form of conveyance. True, until its passage, he could not sell by
deed, but the act of 1705 does not speak of sales by deed. Moreover, it would have been strange if the Legislature, undertaking to
distribute what a decedent might leave at his death, should deem
it necessary expressly to exempt from such distribution what the
decedent did not leave, what he had sold before his death, and
over which they had no power. A mistaken reason is therefore
assigned for the fact that estates tail were not within former intestate laws. Both the acts of 1705 and 1794 contemplated the possibility of sales under direction of the Orphans' Court, before
descent could take effect. The words of the former were "1not
sold or ordered to be sold under this act;" those of the latter were
"not sold or disposed of by will." It was never doubted that the
meaning of the words in the latter act was the same as of the
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words in the corresponding clause of the former. It is apparent,
then, that the premises from which the learned judge draws his
conclusion in Price vs. Taylor are unfounded. The conclusion is
equally obnoxious to just criticism. It assumes the very thing in
argument, when it says that the act of 1833 "declares the line of
descent of all lands which the decedent might have sold in his
lifetime, or disposed of by will." Such is not the language of the
act. It is the real and personal estate, etc., remaining after payment of all just debts and legal charges which shall not have been
sold, or disposed of by will, or otherwise limited by marriage settlement." When it is considered that this act took the place of
the former intestate laws, the construction of which was settled,
that its language is so similar, and especially that it speaks only
of what remains after the payment of debts and legal charges, the
obvious reference of the word sold is not to a disposition.by the
intestate in his lifetime, but to sales by the administrator under
order of the Orphans' Court.
The second reason assigned for the conjecture that estates tail
may descend under the act of 1833 is thus stated in Price vs.
Taylor: "Our statute of wills, passed on the same day with the
intestate law, and one of its supplements (May 6, 1844) provides
for a lineal descent in order to prevent a devise to a child, or tQ a
brother or sister, from lapsing by the death of the devisee in the
lifetime of the testator, and in such case the descent goes according to our law of lineal descents, on the supposition that such is
the testator's intention-that is, on the principle of entailment
until it vests."
This provision in the statute of wills was taken from the act of
1810, and therefore cannot be called in to aid in the construction
of the intestate law of 1833. And it is observable that the provision of the act, declaring that a devise to a child who dies before
the testator, shall be good and available in favor of the issue of
such child surviving, "with like effect as if such devisee had survived the testator," is equally applicable to a devise to a child in
tail. This seems, therefore, a very insufficient reason for holding
that the Legislature, in using the words of the intestate act of
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1833, intended them in a very different sense from that in which
words almost similar had always been understood before.
The other reasons given for the suggestion are such as grew out
of the change of our customs and laws, and the policy of having
our laws simple and homogeneous. Primogeniture, it is said, is
no longer supported by our customs, and hence, it is argued, we
ought no longer to presume that lineal descent is intended by
words of general entailment. That something else than descent
under the intestate laws is meant, it is inferrable from the use of
fit words to set in motion a different descent. But whether it be
so or not, it is certain that, down to 1833, our customs did recognize descent of such estates, according to the course of the common law. In all other cases, primogeniture had, long before that
time, been abolished.
Admit that this was an exceptional custom, it was still a settled
rule of property, and whatever may be our opinions as to the
policy of its continuance, it could be changed only by the Legislature, except at the expense of disturbing multitudes of titles. In
inquiring what the Legislature has done, we are aided but little by
considerations of policy and symmetry. At last we are driven
back to the languagb of the statute. There and there only has
this rule of property been destroyed, if it be no longer in existence.
Holding, therefore, that estates tail are not embraced in our
intestate law of 1833, full effect must be given to the words of distribution in this will. If the words, "or their heirs," are to be
regarded as words of limitation of the estate, given to the remainder-men, then they settle the question. That words of distribution, with words of limitation superadded, show that the remainder-men take not as heirs even, though described as such, but as a
new root of succession, is too well established for controversy.
Doi vs. Lanning, 2 Burr. 1100; -Right vs. Creber, 5 B. & C. 866;
5 Man, & Grang. 628; Finley vs. -iddle, 3 Bin. 139; Stump vs.
Findlay, 2 Rawle, 168; Abbott vs. Jenkins, 10 S. & R. 296. If,
on the other hand, the words, "or their heirs," are to be regarded
as subsequently explained to mean the child or children of deceased
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children, then there is nothing that looks to succession-nothing
that looks beyond the individuals that might be in being at the
death of Elizabeth Bones.
The rule in Shelley's case is the law of Pennsylvania, but there
is no reason why it should be applied more extensively than in the
country from which it derived its birth. It often defeats the
declared will of a testator, and frustrates his purpose of making
provision for more than one generation of his family. Still it is to
be enforced whenever it is truly applicable. But it has been held
from Wild's case, 6 Coke, down to the present day, that when the
devise of the remainder is not to "heirs" or "heirs of body," but
to "children," they take as a new stock and not as heirs. In
Goodtitle vs. IHerring, 1 East. 164, there was a limitation for life,
with a remainder to the "heirs male of the body" of the tenant for
life, severally, successively, one after another, as they and every
one of them should be in seniority of age and priority of birth, the
elder of such sons and the heir male of his body being always preferred before the younger of such son or sons, and the heir male of
his and their body and bodies, and for want of such issue then to
the daughters, &c., and in default of such issue, over. The description embraced the whole line of lineal heirs, preferring them in the
order of common law descent, and they were described as "heirs
male of the body," yet as they were also called sons, the latter
designation overcame the force of the technical words of limitation,
and the parent took but an estate for life. See also North vs.
Martin, 6 Sim. 266; Doe vs. Provost, 5 Johns. 61; Gernet vs.
Linn, 7 Casey, 94. The latter case is very like the present. In
it, the late Chief Justice Lewis remarks: "It is, therefore, very
clear that when the term children is used to designate the object of
the testator's bounty, and some of them are in esse at the date of
the will, and also at the time it takes effect, neither the policy nor
the words of the rule apply." After a pretty thorough search, I
have not been able to find a single such case in which the rule has
been applied, prior to Williams vs. Leech, 4 Cas. 89, and even in
that case there were no children of the first taker at the date of the
will, nor even when it took effect. That case, however, does treat
the word children as if it meant heirs in the will then before the
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Court. It was followed by Naglee's Appeal, 9 Casey, 89, a construction of the same will, and by iArJKee vs. M'Kinley, 9 Casey,
92. In the former of the *cases, there was in the first place an
absolute gift of the fee simple to the daughter of the testator, then
unmarried, and without children. In a subsequent part of the will,
the testator provided that none of his children should sell or convey
any of the real estate devised to them, but enjoy it during life, and
that after their death it should be divided equally among their
children and their heirs. This was followed by a devise over to the
surviving children, if either of his children should die "without
issue." It might have been argued, though I think unsuccessfully,
that the testator had used the words issue and the children, as of
the same import. The decision, however was not put upon that
ground. The will was regarded as a gift of the fee to the first
taker, followed by an unavailing attempt to restrict alienation. It
was also quite strongly intimated that it might be an estate tail in
the daughter. The case of MJ'Yee vs. M'Kinley was that of a
devise for life, remainder to the children of the tenant for life, if
any surviving, or issue of such children, and in case of no children
or issue of children, then over to the relations and lawful heirs of
the testator. This was held an estate in fee simple in the first
taker.
The case was evidently an amicable one. There appears to have
been no argument except in support of a tenancy in fee of the first
taker, and the decision was by a bare majority of the Court.
Neither this case, nor that of Williams vs. Leech, nor Naglee's
Appeal, in the particulars of which we have spoken, is sustainable
on authority. If they are to be regarded as the law of the land,
the result must be a wide disturbance of titles, the foreshadowings
of which are already to be seen, an extension of the rule in Shelley's case far beyond all precedent, and an insuperable obstacle in
the way of testators against making such settlements of their property as have been common ever since statutes of wills existed.
Enough has, however, been said, to show that under the will of
Robert Harris, Elizabeth Bones took only an estate for life, and,
consequently, that the decree of the Orphans' Court was correct.
LowrIE, C. J., dissents.

JOHN B. RICHMAN vs. THOMAS LIPPINCOTT.

369

In the New Jersey Supreme Court, November Term, 1860.
.Ejectmentfor Lands in Gloucester.
JOHN B. RICHMAN vs. THOMAS LIPPINCOTT.
1. To bar an estate tail by a common recovery, it is necessary that the tenant to the
pr ecipe should, either at the time the writ issued, or before judgment given, have
an estate of freehold in possession, either by right or by wrong, in the lands
demanded by the writ.
2. A tenant in tail, by deed of bargain and sale, with covenants of warranty and
further assurance, conveyed to two, giving at the same time a bond in a penal
sum, conditioned to be void if he should suffer a common recovery of the lands
conveyed. The grantees divided between them the lands, and one of them conveyed to a third person. After the conveyance by one of the grantees, the tenant
in tail executed a deed tripartite with B, as the tenant to the proecipe, and C, as
the recoverer, reciting that the lands had been reconveyed to him by his grantees :
a recovery was then suffered, and after judgment, he, who was the tenant in tail,
reconveyed to his former grantees in fee simple-held, there was no such outstanding estate in the grantee of the grantees from the tenant in tail, as to render
it necessary that his estate should have been surrendered, to enable the tenant in
tail to constitute a good tenant to the proecipe.
3. The deed from the tenant in tail to his grantees was merely a deed to lead the
uses; the recovery was in pursuance of it, and it would, therefore, seem that
there was no surrender necessary from the grantees of the tenant in tail.
4. After a lapse of more than forty years, the recital in the deed creating the
tenant to the prmcipe, of possession by one of the grantees of the tenant in tail,
who reconveyed for the purpose of obtaining a common recovery; is sufficient to
raise the presumption of a surrender by the grantee of him, so alleged to have
been in possession, and therefore to enable the tenant in tail to make'a good
tenant to the przecipe.

The opinion of the Court was delivered by
HAINES, J.-Henry Richman, by his last will and testament,
dated January 6, 1779, and proved 15th September, 1787, devised
a certain plantation to his son, Isaac Richman, "during his life, and
then to the heirs of his body forever."
On the 3d June, 1779, Isaac Richman, having attained his majority, conveyed the premises so devised to Isaac Howey and
William Mulford, by deed of bargain and sale, with covenants of
warranty and covenant for further assurance. With the deed of
conveyance, he also delivered to the grantees his bond, in the penal
sum of one thousand pounds, condition to be void if he should suffer
a common recovery, whereby the entailment of the said plantation
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should be broken, and a good title in fee simple be vested in the
said Howey and Mulford.
The land so conveyed to Howey and Mulford was subsequently
divided between them, and mutual r~leases executed. Then, on the
29th April, 1806, Mulford conveyed that part of the premises which
he held in severalty to William Holmes, from whom the title of the
landlord of the defendant is said to be deduced.
On the 12th June, 1789, nine days after the execution of the
deed by Isaac Richman to Howey arid Mulford, the act of the
Legislature was passed to abolish fines and recoveries; but on 8th
of March, 1806, a special act was passed to authorize Isaac Richman to suffer a common recovery of the plantation devised to him,
in the manner common recoveries were suffered, prior to the passing
of the act to abolish them.
Isaac Richman then took measurei to suffer a common recovery,
and for that purpose executed a deed tripartite with John Moore
White, as the recoverer, and Charles Ewing, as the tenant to the
prmcipe, reciting that Howey and Mulford had reconveyed the
whole premises to him, Isaac Richman. The judgment of recovery
was rendered on 2d September, 1806; and Isaac Richman, on the
13th September, in the same year, executed to Mulford and Howey
a deed conveying and further assuring to them the whole premises in fee simple.
Isaac Richman died on 3d October, 1852, leaving his only child
and heir-at-law, John B. Richman, the plaintiff in this action, who
claims under the devise as the heir of the tenant in tail.
To the action of ejectment for that part of the premises which
was conveyed to William Holmes, the defence is the common recovery,
by which it is insisted that the entailment of the estate was barred,
and a fee simple created in Isaac Richman.
In reply, it is urged that the common recovery, so far as it
relates to the premises so conveyed to Holmes, is void, for want of
a proper tenant to the precipe, and the whole case turns upon the
validity or invalidity of such recovery.
No question is raised as to the validity of the special act of June,
1806, authorizing the common recovery to be made, as if the act
abolishing fines and recoveries had not been passed.
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By the 22d section of the first constitution of this State, it is
provided that the common law of England, as well as so much of
the statute law as had been theretofore practised here, should remain
in force until it should be altered by a future law of the Legislature.
No such law of the Legislature was passed till 13th June, 1799,
-Pat. 436, Sec. 4,-when it was enacted that no statute or act
of Parliament of England or of Great Britain should thereafter have
force or authority in this State.
Prior to that time, common recoveries were suffered according to
the common law of England and acts of Parliament. The special
act in favor of Isaac Richman authorized him to suffer the recovery,
as he could have done before the 12th June, 1799, when fines and
recoveries were abolished; and the proceedings must be tested by
the rules of the law of England, in force at that time.
By these rules, one of the indispensable circumstances to the
suffering of a common recovery was that the person against whom
the writ was brought should be the actual tenant of the freehold,
either at the time the writ issued out, or before the judgment given.
A recovery being a real action, carried on through all its forms,
it is absolutely necessary that the tenant to the proecipe, or person
against whom the writ of entry is brought, should have an estate of
freehold in possession, either by right or by wrong, in the lands
demanded by the writ; because, if he has not the freehold, it would
not be in his power to restore the lands as the writ directs; and, in
common recoveries, there is the additional reason, that as the
demandant can recover nothing against the tenant unless he has the
freehold, so the tenant can have no recompense in value against the
vouchee for what he has lost, for until the demandant sues out
execution against the tenant, the tenant can have no execution
againt the vouchee; and if the tenant has nothing in the land, no
execution can be sued out against him, nor can any reconveyance
in value be had over: consequently there will be no recompense to
bind him, and the recovery will be no bar. 5 Cruise Dig. Title 36;
Recovery, Chap. 2, Sect. 10.
In Sect. 19, of same title and chapter, the author says, "1that,
as it is absolutely necessary that the tenant to the prrecipe should
have an estate of freehold,.it follows that those who have not an
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estate of freehold cannot suffer a recovery, because they cannot convey a freehold to the person against whom the writ is to be brought."
In Douner vs. Parkhurst, 3 Atk. 135, a fine was levied by a
tenant for years, and a remainder-man in tail to make a tenant to
the proecipe, and it was determined that the recovery was void,
because none of the parties to the fine had an estate of freehold in
possession in the lands.
In Taylor ex dem Atkyns vs. Horde, 1 Burrows' R. 60, the
objection to the recovery was that Lady Atkyns, the widow of Sir
Robert, the father, had an estate for life in the premises, and did
not join, by surrender or otherwise, in any conveyance of the freehold to the tenant against whom the prmcipe was brought. Lord
Mansfield, who delivered the opinion of the Court in a very learned
opinion, held that in every light and upon every ground of law the
recovery was bad.
. The same principle was subsequently affirmed in Goodtitle ex
dem Bridges vs. Duke of Chandos, 2 Burrows' R. 1065, 72; and
it is maintained in the elementary books and annotations of
reporters.
Sergeant Williams, in note 7,on page 42 of 2 Saunders' R., and
on the authority of Pigott, says that though they are fictitious proceedings and amicable actions, yet it is necessary the awtores falule,
as they, are sometimes termed, should be the same as in adversary
suits, and the writ must be brought against such person only as
would be an unexcelbtionable tenant in an adversary action.
The form in 6 Wood's Conveyancing, 104, which the entry in
this case is said to have followed, contemplates the same thing.
The question there is, Was Charles Ewing, at the time of suing
out the prmcipe, or afterwards, a proper tenant of the part of the
premises conveyed to Holmes? If the conveyances from Richman
to Howey and Mulford, and from Mulford to Holmes, created an
independent outstanding estate, it was necessary that the estate so
created should have been surrendered, to enable Richman to constitute a proper tenant.
A deed of bargain and sale, although purporting to convey a fee
simple, yet actually conveys only the estate of the bargainer. Den
vs. Crawford, 3 Hal. 108 ; 4 Cruise's Dig. 123; 1 Bacon's Abr. 460.
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A release or deed of bargain and sale, by a tenant in tail, gives
a base fee, voidable by the issue in tail, Goodnight vs. Mead et al.
3 Burr. 1705 ; Mackel vs. Clark, 2 Salk. 619: by virtue of which the
releasce or bargainee has an estate for the life of the tenant in tail.
But such instrument is not a lease for life, and is not within the
provision of the statute, 14 George, 1 Ch. 20, by the first section
of which it was rendered unnecessary to surrender leases for life or
lives; or to have the concurrence of the lessee to the constituting
of a tenant to the proecipe, that relates to intermediate estates, not
of inheritance, and not to the whole interest of the tenant in tail,
which, although a base fee, is an estate of inheritance, 2 Bl. 109;
Seymour's case, 10, 60, 95, and 96; given also in 2 Burrows, 713,
and in truise, fully sustains this view of the statute 14 Geo. 1 Oh.
20. In that case, Oheney, the tenant in tail, had sold the premises
to Higham and his heirs, by deed of bargain and sale, duly enrolled,
which, by force of the statue Henry VIII. Oh. 16, was sufficient
conveyance of all the interest of the bargainer, by virtue of which
deed Higham entered and was seized of the premises: accordingly,
a fine, with proclamations, levied a year afterwards, was held not
to bar the right of the heir in tail.
The question,* then, arises, whether Richman's deed to Howey
and Mulford created a distinct outstanding estate so as to require
a surrender?
In construing the transaction, the intention of the parties,
expressed in the deeds and record, is to be the guide, and that
intention is to be gathered from the whole proceeding.
Referring, then, to the deed from Richman to Howey and Mulford, we find a recital of the devise from Henry Richman to Isaac
Richman, by which the estate tail was created; and that it purports
to create a fee simple.
It contains, also, a covenant of warranty and covenant of further
assurance. Connected with this, and as a part of the same trarsaction, is the bond in the penalty of one thousand pounds, with a
condition that Richman should suffer a common recovery, whereby
the entailment of the premises should be broken, and a good title
in fee simple vested in Howey and Mulford.
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What was the intention of the parties in making and receiving
the deed of bargain and sale? Was it to create thereby merely
a base fee-an estate, only, for the life of the tenant in tail, with
the right to enforce the covenants of warranty and further assurance
against his estate ? Or, was it not rather to contract for the securing to Howey and Mulford a pelfect title in fee simple, and to use
this deed as part of the means of so doing ?
At the time of making the will of Henry Richman, and the execution of the deed by Isaac Richman, common recoveries were
usual, and a favorite mode of conveyance.
They were regarded as common assurances, and as a proper mode
of barring entails. Richman, before the execution of the deed,
had a right by the then existing law to suffer a recovery, and thereby,
to procure a fee simple in the premises.
He had a right to contract with another to procure for him a full
title; and by this deed he did contract with Howey and Mulford to
convey to them such a title. That deed conveyed a present interest, but it also provides for a larger estate by the further assurance.
That larger* estate could be obtained only by a fine levied, or
common recovery suffered. The bond expressed the mode by which
they meant it to be done.
The deed, therefore, and the subsequent proceedings, in suffering
the recovery, are to be regarded as parts of the same transaction,
and consistent with each other.
It would be strange, indeed, if a party could make a lawful contract for the conveyance of an estate, and yet defeat his own
object by the contract itself; but such would be the case if the
deed to Harvey and Mulford divested Richman of the power to
make a good tenant to the proecipe.
The length of time that elapsed between the execution of the
deed and the suffering of the recovery is no objection to this view
of-the case. The act abolishing fines and recoveries, which was
passed within nine days after the execution of the deed, prevented
any further action in fulfilling the contract, until the act of 1806
was passed, authorizing it to be done.
That act and the recitals in its preamble show that the Legisla-
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ture regarded the deed and the bond only as a covenant to procure
to Howey and Mulford a good and perfect title to the premises.
No .provision is there made for a surrender, but authority to Rich'
man to suffer a common recovery in the same manner that it could
have been suffered prior to the act abolishing fines and recoveries.
The fair construction to be given to the deed is that it was meant
only as a deed to lead the uses to express the intention to make a
further assurance of the premises to the use of the bargainees, and
such construction is sustained by authority.
In Doe ex dem Odiarne vs. Whitelead, 2 Burrows' R. 704,
Timothy Stoughton, being tenant in tail previously to his marriage,
and in consideration thereof, by indentures of lease and release,
granted and released the premises to trustees for certain uses, and
therein covenanted to levy a fine, with proclamations, which should
enure to the interests and purposes and the estates in the indenture
of release mentioned.
After the marriage, he levied the fine according to the covenant.
In an action brought by the heir in tail, the release and the fine
were held to be one assurance, and to operate as such; and Lord
Mansfield remarked: "It would be a strange thing that the form of
a conveyance should destroy the very intent of it, and that the fine
itself should destroy the estate of the tehant for life, by occasioning
the forfeiture of it. Instead of this, all the preceding transaction
was executory, and the operation is only as a declaration of the
uses of the fine. 'Tis like a case of a tenant to the prmecipe, who
is considered merely as an instrument and not as the strict real
owner of the land. This release is but a deed to lead the uses of a
fine." And he distinguished between that and Seymour's case,
which, he said, went upon quite different grounds. Cheney sold to
Iligham, by indenture of bargain and sale enrolled, by force of
which Higham entered and was seized accordingly. Afterwards,
and nearly a year after the bargain and sale, Cheney levied the fine
to Higham and his heirs, with general warranty: so that the bargain and sale was totally unconnected with the fine; and it does
not appear that at the time of executing the deed of bargain and
sale there was any intention of levying a fine or of barring the
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entailment: whereas in the case before .him the whole was one
assurance.
This was a case. of a fine, but Lord Mansfield called that a
blunder, and said in strict regular form it should have been a common recovery.
In Cromwell's case, 2 Rep. 69, cited in 5 Cruise's Dig. 218, where
the heir claimed a right of entry for condition broken, it was held
that if the fine had been levied for the purpose of corroborating the
conveyance by which the condition was created, it would not have
destroyed the condition, for in that case the fine and conveyance
would be construed together, and would operate as one assurance.
The same principle is held in the Countess of Rutland's case, 5
Rep. 25, pited in 4 Cruise, 152.
If the indenture in this case was but a deed to lead the uses, and
the recovery was in pursuance of it, it would seem that there was
no necessity of a surrender by the covenantees, and the recovery
would vest in them the fee simple of the land, discharged of the
entailment. And their title, perfected, would enure to the use
and benefit of Holmes.
Again, it is insisted by the defendant, that if a surrender of the
estate created by the deeds to Howey and Mulford and to Holmes
was requisite to constitute a proper tenant to the prmcipe, that such
a surrender is to be presumed.
Common recovery, as a mode of assurance, was not only a creature but a favorite of the courts of England. Devised by the
ecclesiastics to avoid the statutes of mortmain, it was afterwards
adopted to bar estates tail.
The statute de donis conditionalibus, passed in the twelfth year
of Ed. 1., A. D. 1275, required the will of the donor to be observed,
and out of which grew, by construction, estates in fee tail and
reversion, caused many real or imaginary evils, by restraining the
alienations of estates, thereby prejudicing creditors, encouraging
disobedience of children, and treason against the king. But the
House of Lords, sympathizing with the landed interests, persistently rejected every effort to repeal it. Having endured these evils
for nearly two hundred years, in the twelfth year of Ed. IV.) 1472,
-
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by the countenance of that monarch, the judges declared in Faltman's case, (Bro.
80, title recovery in value, 19 title tail, D6,)
that a common recovery was a sufficient bar of estates tail.
Since then, and until abolished by our statute, common recoveries were not only a usual mode of assurance of lands, but an
effective and ready method of transferring an estate tail into a fee
simple in the tenant in tail; and so much were they favored that
the courts sometimes presumed in consequence of particular circumstances that the tenant for life had surrendered his estate through
no surrender, was actually proved; and in Green vs. Proud,1
Vent. 257, reported, also, in 1 Mod. 117, by name of Green against
Proud, where part of the land had been leased for life, and then
the recovery was by the person in reversion, so that there was no
tenant to the prcecipe, a surrender was presumed from the length
of time, (forty years,) during which the possession had gone with
the recovery, and in Goodtitle ex dem Bridge vs. Duke of 6handos,
2 Burrows' R. 1065, declared that when a person had a power to
suffer a recovery, and thereby bar his estate tail, omnia prcesumuntar rite et solemniter acta, until the contrary appears; and that it
was reasonable that it should be so, but if the contrary appear, then
there is an end to the presumption: as was the case in the Earl of
Suffolk's recovery, in Easter term, 1747, Keen on demise of the
Earl of.Portsmouthvs. Earl of Effingham, 2 Strange, 1267, when
the contrary did appear, and the presumption was destroyed by the
deeds actually produced, and which were clearly wrong. In the
same,case, 1065, he added that there was no ground for a presumption of a surrender by the tenant for life, but that there were two
particular reasons against it: one is that there does not appear to
have been any intention of the remainder-man in tail to suffer a
recovery of these particular lands; the other, that there was no
possession under the recovery.
So in Dormer vs. Parkhurst,before referred to, where the tenant
to the proecipe was attempted to be made by a fine void for want of
proper parties, the presumption was overcome.
But in the College case, 8 Co. 58, cited in 2 Bur. 1069, where a
common recovery was had against a remainder-man in tail in the
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life-time of his mother, who was a tenant for life; and she was
expressly alleged to be ad tu-ne tenens liberi tenementi, and it
could not be intended that she had surrendered her estate, or that
he had entered for a forfeiture; yet, even there, rather than the common recovery should be taken to be void for want of a tenant to
the prrecipe, the Court intended that he was in by disseisin.
In this case it is evident that Isaac Richman, at the time he executed the deed to Howey'and Mulford, had the power to suffer a
recovery, and that he intended so to do. For that purpose the
bargainers surrender to him the estate by reconveyance, but it does
not appear that Holmes surrendered by any reconveyance, or that
after the recovery any further conveyance was made to him. If
the facts ended here, it would seem that there was an attempt to
surrender the estates to Richman, and that they failed to do so
for want of proper parties: itnowhere appearing that Holmes
united in the surrender.
But it further appears by the recitals of the deed from Richman
to Howey and Mulford, that the premises thereby conveyed were then
in the tenure and occupation of Mulford; and in the tripartite deed,
by which the tenant to the precipe was intended to be made, it is
again recited that Mulford was then in the tenure of the same
premises.
The word tenure is one of very extensive signification; -it may
import a mere possession, and may include every holding of an inheritance. In the first deed it was used as a synonym of the word
occupation; the recitals show that it could not have been otherwise.
And in the second deed, reconveying the premises, it may have been
used in the same sense; but it, at least, recites a possession and actual
occupation by Mulford. How that occupation was obtained does
not appear; whether rightfully or wrongfully, it is sufficient after a
lapse of more than forty years to raise the presumption of a surrender by Holmes, a presumption that Mulford, in connection with
his tenure, had such an interest in the freehold as enabled him to
make such surrender to Richman as would give him power to make
a good tenant to the pr.ecipe.
The evidence that Holmes moved on the farm, conveyed to him
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by Mulford in March, 1807, corroborates the presumption, as that
was after the recovery. The occupation by him to the time of his
death in 1822, and by others under him to the commencement of
this action, is presumptive of a conveyance, or further assurance
to him.
Under all circumstances of the case, I think there is ground to
presume that there was a good tenant to the prmcipe, and that
the recovery was legally suffered, and that judgment upon the verdict should be entered for the defendant.

in the Court of Common Pleas of Brie County, Pennsylvania.
COWMMONWEALTH EX REL. vs. THE BANK OF COMMERCE.
1. The 27th section of the General Banking Law of Pennsylvania of 16th April,
1850, is technically a penal statute, and is to be strictly construed.
2. To authorize the Court or a Judge to decree an assignment by the directors of a
bank, under the 27th section of the Act of 16th April, 1850, it must appear that
the financial officer of the bank not only refused to pay its notes or certificates in
gold or silver on demand, but that he also wilfully refused to indorse on them the
day and year when they were presented for payment, or refused to give a certificate for money deposited in the bank.

Yineent, for relator.
Galbraith and Grant, for respondent.
The facts of the case fully appear in the opinion of the Court,
delivered February 1, 1861, by
JOHNSON, J.-This is a proceeding under the 27th section of the
Act of 16th April, 1850, commonly called the General Banking
Law, to compel the Bank of Commerce to make an assignment to
trustees, and thus work a forfeiture of its charter. The evidence
presented, and admitted by respondent, shows that on the 21st day
of December, 1860, the relator "presented $1,135 of the circulating notes of the bank at the counter, during banking hours, and
demanded payment in coin, and that payment thereof was refused
by the bank." It was further admitted, to be used as evidence,
that the proper officer of the bank offered at the time to make the
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indlorsement required by the 25th section'of the same act, but that
it was not desired by the relator.
Under this state of facts, it is claimed by the relator that the
bank is subject to the decree contemplated by the 27th section of
the act, requiring the directors thereof to execute "a general
assignment of all the estate, real and personal, of the bank to such
person or persons as they may select, subject to the approval of the
Court of Common Pleas."
This section is essentially and technically a penal statute, and
requires in its construction the application of different rules from
those jhat obtain in the interpretation of those statutes termed
remedial. So far as known to this Court, it has received no
authoritative construction. Let us see, then, what it requires, and
what power it vests in the Court or a Judge, under a proceeding of
this kind.
The 24th section declares "a failure or refusal to redeem its
notes, and pay its liabilities in gold and silver, upon demand being
made at the banking house of said bank, during banking hours, an
absolute forfeiture of the charter." This result 'can be worked out
by a proper proceeding instituted by the Attorney-General.
The 25th section requires two things: first, that the cashier of
any bank refusing to pay specie on demand for its liabilities, shall,
when required, give a certificate of the time and amount of the
deposit to any person making a deposit; and, second, that the
president and cashier of the bank at the time of demand being
made for the payment of any note, bill, or obligation, or money
deposited, the payment of which in gold and silver shall have been
refused, shall make an indorsement thereon, setting forth the day
and year of such demand, and subscribe his name thereto; and
inflicts a penalty on such officer for a refusal so to do.
This proceeding is authorized by the 27th section, to be instituted
upon affidavit that said bank has refused to redeem any of its
obligations, on demand, in gold and silver coin ; and, after directing
as to the preliminary proceedings, then further enacts that "upon
the hearing of the parties, if the said Court or Judge shall be
satisfied of the truth of said complaint, and that the provisions of
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the 25th section of this act have been wilfully violated, then the
directors of said bank shall make and execute, under their corporate
seal, a general assignment," &c.
I have examined the pamphlet laws of 1850, and could find there
no evidence of a misprint of this section, as quoted. If it had said
the 24th, instead of the 25th, section, although redundant, its
provisions would have been consistent and self-sustaining. The
consequence is, the different and incongruous sections of the act are
so framed as substantially to neutralize each other. Before the
bank can be compelled to make an assignment, it must be shown
that payment of some of its obligations in gold or silver coin has
been demanded and refused; and, further, that the financial officer
has wilfully refused, on demand, to give a certificate to a depositor,
or refused to endorse the ob]igation or certificate presented, with
the date of the demand, and sign his name thereto. This is just
what the evidence in this case does not show, and just what no
president or cashier would ever refuse to do.
It can hardly be supposed, consistently with a proper respect for
the intelligence and integrity of the Legislature, that the real
intention of the law-makers is contained in these enactments. But
the Court is powerless. It can neither make, mend, nor modify
penal statutes.
That this statute is of this character, there can be no doubt, from
the forfeiture of the corporate franchise, which it imposes in the
contingency of an assignment, and the adjudications of the Courts
in analagous cases. A similar provision was contained in the 7th
article of the charter granted by the Legislature to the United
States Bank in 1836, except that ii required the Court or Judge to
take the evidence of the demand and refusal to pay specie, and
transmit it to the Governor, who was, by proclamation, to declare
the charter forfeited.
A proceeding like this having been instituted before the Court of
Common Pleas of Philadelphia, against that bank, the unanimous
opinion of all the Judges-King, Randall, and Jones declared
the act a penal one, and that "the forfeiture is either a penalty to
enforce a private claim, or the refusal
to pay a single note, being a
I

